a teachable moment on property rights

One of the first ideas economics students learn about long run growth and a stable economy (say, in an introductory micro or macro class) is the necessity for protecting property rights.

Protecting property rights is important, they learn, because you need incentives to invest and grow. If you are always worried about the state coming in and confiscating your property, or taking it without just compensation, then you will never invest resources and develop. Students are provided with tons of examples of corrupt governments (usually in Africa, or ancient parts of the world that were slow to develop) as empirical evidence "in support" of this claim - these countries do not respect property rights, which is (apparently) why they are poor.

Interestingly enough, many developed countries today did not take this path toward prosperity. There is a kind of "kicking away the ladder" story going on here, as there is with trade protection in Ha Joon Chang's work, and it's very teachable. Because in fact, even in liberal democracies such as the U.S., property rights have routinely been compromised in the name of economic growth or efficiency. These are not just "rent seeking" cases by the way, but are fundamental traditions in property and contract law.

Perhaps most strikingly, you can find, hidden deep within the court records, judges who actually argue that looser protection of property rights is what promotes the incentives to develop! Which provides an excellent thought piece for students, to consider the political bias underlying the protected property rights view (which, if anything, was rhetoric that has its roots more in the institutions slave south, which needed to establish the master's "dominion" over his slave, than in the industrial north).

Here is Judge Livingston in a classic U.S. water rights case from 1805 (Palmer v. Mulligan, you can find a discussion of the case and others here:

defendants had the same right opposite their ground. . . must be restrained within reasonable bounds so as not to deprive a man of the enjoyment of his property, merely because of some trifling inconvenience or damage to others . . . Were the law to regard little inconveniences of this nature, he who could first build a dam or mill on any public or navigable river, would acquire an exclusive right, at least for some distance, whether he owned the contiguous banks or not. . . . the public, whose advantage is always to be regarded, would be deprived of the benefit which always attends competition and rivalry.

In the italicized section of this opinion, you can clearly see Livingston arguing that an infringement of property rights could be justified because it breaks up monopoly ownership, thereby promoting competition in land use. This is certainly a "teachable" moment for anyone looking for an accessible, fun, intuitive way of breaking down biased ideas of property rights in mainstream economics teaching.

Use Backward Design to Help Your Students Get the Most Out of Your Courses

Backward design for Introductory Heterodox Economics

Many of us have our favorite books or papers (or even blog articles) which we think best capture the criticisms of mainstream economics. Naturally then, we want our students to follow in our footsteps: read the same critique and hope it sticks with them the same way it did with us. So, we design our courses around those readings and, well, "hope for the best" when it comes to what sinks in. Tests or other assignments "prove" to us how well they did that.

Backward design goes about things a bit differently. It says we should start with what we want to achieve from a class, and only design the syllabus and reading list until the end. What kinds of knowledge or skills would we like our students to acquire? We then figure out what would be sufficient evidence to prove that they had acquired that knowledge or those skills. Finally, we get to work on designing our syllabi in a way that meets those learning and assessment goals.

When looking at things this way, most of us will back up a bit and be more honest with ourselves: before we get to the good stuff on critique, we want our students to come away with some grasp of core economics. This helps them to become economically literate and it also allows them to appreciate our coveted critiques.

Goal: I want my students to have a solid grasp of the principles of demand and supply, of utility and production theory, and of what it means for an economy to be in equilibrium.

Evidence that I have achieved the goal: This could vary according to the instructor. For some, taking a multiple choice test about the definitions and themes from the above-mentioned topics and getting a passing grade is sufficient. For others, writing a complete paragraph or essay explaining a newspaper article using the themes and terms from class is sufficient. For others, solving problems is sufficient.

How I will structure my course to obtain the learning and assessment of the goal: You probably want to address a combination of the points made in the preceding paragraph. In addition to stimulating lectures, you might give a multiple choice exam or two because they urge students to master the material at the middle or end of a class. You might have a few in-class writing assignments as a way to challenge students to articulate and extend what they have learned to the real world. And finally, problems (done as a group or individually) are a great way of grappling with the inner analytical mechanisms of a theory in a way that multiple choice questions or essays simply cannot do.

Now that your students have a solid grasp of economic theory, you can then turn to critique. But how to go about it - just have them read articles and discuss the points in class, or do problems with modified assumption sets? Use the same method above (i.e., backward design), but tailor it to your own needs in the course. If articulation is an important value, you might consider seminars or writing assignments. If a solid grasp of the argument is what you're looking for, a writing assignment or problem set might be more suitable. But try to be as specific as possible and always remember to work backward - don't arrive at the specific readings or quizzes/assessments until you've figured out what exactly it is you want students to take away from your course.

Note: some of this information came out of discussions at the very-informative UMass Pedagogy Workshop in Academic Year 2011-2012. See the following link for more materials. http://egsoumass.org/courses

Healthcare in America

Teaching about healthcare can be complex with all of the institutions and laws and agencies involved. The frustration is amplified by the fact that we know something is clearly wrong, clearly inefficient about the whole system.

How do we wrap our heads around it?

Here is a short video by economists at UMass Amherst as well as others (including an appearance by Jeffrey Sachs) which does a great job at getting at the facts in a clear manner. It's part of the Econ4 project: economics for the people, planet, and future. Check it out, share it (or this blog post) with your networks, and consider using it in your classroom:


The Bottom Line: Healthcare from Softbox on Vimeo.

new empirical research on unions and upward mobility

At various points during Anti-Mankiw's history we've devoted ourselves to a topic that is often completely ignored by the mainstream: institutions. And even when they are talked about, it's usually in the context of their distorting or enhancing effects on economic efficiency. Schooling, we are told, raises the productive potential of the individual by imparting on him or her the skills or signals conducive to success in the labor market. Unions, we are told, distort labor market equilibrium by artificially raising wages. No matter the story, you can bet that it has something to do, in the end, with economic efficiency. [Read this post which sums up Anti-Mankiw's view of the education debate with the mainstream quite well.]

Those devoted to a social economy approach, on the other hand, realize that mainstream economics' views about efficiency are overly simplified at best and downright biased at most. Boiling efficiency down to a simple, monetized concept of "welfare" in which outcomes are compared to an idealized market equilibrium is inappropriate when other social desiderata are relevant -- such as health, or stable living standards, or a sustainable environment. In the social economy approach, unions are signals of a stable society because collective bargaining can be used to counter employer power.

New state-level evidence from the U.S. presented by our colleague at UMass Eric Hoyt as well as CEPR senior economist John Schmitt shows that there is at least a weak positive relationship between union density and various measures of upward economic mobility (see the link for the details -- it's a short post and would be a great teaching resource in an intro-level course). Such evidence goes a long way in furthering the social economy approach to economics, in which economic mobility is dealt with in a concrete manner. While Mankiw may suggest time and again that education is the means by which economic opportunity is realized, neither the data nor the theory -- from a social-institutional standpoint -- validates his claim (at least, not as education is currently done in the U.S.!).

Hoyt and Schmitt, on the other hand, suggest an alternative institution for enhancing economic mobility and have the data to back it up.

the weaknesses of analogical reasoning

This article, shared recently by Marginal Revolution, got Anti-Mankiw's blood boiling, for all the wrong reasons. The core issue was the defense of mainstream economics through the use of particular analogies that we believe are fundamentally flawed.

As we explain elsewhere, analogies are often a deceptive way of explaining the core analytical framework of a concept, because an analogy between A and B is only as good as the likeness between A and B. It seems better to start off by explaining the core logical framework from within the language of economics, instead of alluding to its likeness to other sciences. Unfortunately, that is not the approach taken in Mankiw's textbook -- as early as chapter 2 he analogizes the study of "economic science" to physics.

What are the specific offenses that the article makes?

1. Saying that economics is like other sciences, such as medicine. As the article states,

"Galbraith’s and Varoufakis’s worry [that economics has become too mathematical] has been around for 20 years, says Grossman at Princeton. “It comes and goes. It particularly comes when economic times are hard, when it appears that the old way has let us down.” Did the old way let us down? “No,” he answers, “which is very different from saying we know everything. … I don’t think medicine has let us down because there are diseases we don’t know how to cure.”"

Economics is not like medical science. In medicine, all hypotheses go through rigorous empirical testing before they can be accepted by the field, and even at that point, caution is exercised when it comes to making generalizations. Also, in medicine, we don't have to make assumptions about how cells or molecules behave, while with people, making such assumptions is not only very important, but subject to a much wider menu of possible interpretations, often with dramatically different, and political, implications.

2. The idea that there is a "free market" in economics departments, so that graduate students can pick the ones that seem to be offering the most realistic version of economic theory out there. As the article states,

"Harald Uhlig, chair of the economics department at the University of Chicago, another of the No. 1-rated economics graduate schools in the U.S., offers a kind of a model of his own. In an e-mail, he writes: “Above all, I do not believe in central planning. What is true in private markets is true in PhD education as well: It is good to see different places try different approaches, to let the PhD students decide where they want to be educated, and to let the marketplace for future scientists decide what works and what does not. I am sure that if the new PhD program in Athens is successful and produces the top young economics researchers of the next generation, many other PhD programs will take notice.”

Such a comment ignores the very real differences between top graduate programs and lower-ranked schools in terms of prestige -- something that often goes hand-in-hand with support for the status quo and getting top (influential) jobs, and refraining from any radical criticism of the current paradigm (which is what economics needs at this point).

The thing that concerns us most about these analogies is that, for the casual reader who doesn't know much about the field of economics, it is very easy to take these analogies for granted. Without any rigorous knowledge of the field, understanding is made easier by analogy.

But for those who have an advanced understanding of the field, the weakness of the analogical approach is clear. We are, indeed, actively promoting ignorance by taking such an approach, instead of being honest about our flaws and about the structure of graduate education.

politics and methodology: alternative teaching resources

"Pyramid of Capitalist System"

We at Anti-Mankiw are no strangers to the idea that politics shapes economists' theories about how the world works. Unlike Mankiw, who regularly asserts in his textbook an ideal-type of "observation, theory, observation" method of economic science, the fact of the matter is that how we view the world often shapes our evaluation of the facts of that world.

Perhaps in no other place in economic theory is this fact more true, and thus more dangerous, than in the Marxian vs. non-Marxian (or neoclassical) theory of distribution. When Marx argued that the source of all wealth is the laborer and that surplus value, or profits, were taken from the laborer by the capitalist, neoclassical economists replied with a theory of distribution asserting that capital earns its fare share of the output, too.

The neoclassical response in the late 1800s offered a new theory, or new way of looking at the world. This subsequently helped shape how all neoclassical economists thought about the source of profits: instead of seeing them as fundamentally sourced from workers, these economists saw capital and entrepreneurs simply getting their fair share of the pie -- represented by the marginal price of capital multiplied by the marginal physical product of capital, or the value added by capitalists to production. This victory was a major one for capitalists because it essentially legitimated their control/monopoly over the means of production, which is really the main role capitalists play.

No more explanation for all the profit was necessary! And the political consequences were indeed severe. For one, the neoclassical response to Marx came in the 1870s, when labor militancy across Western Europe and America was reacting to a rapidly growing capitalist power in politics and the workplace. And the political victory is felt even up to today: even when compensation starts to be outstripped by worker productivity as it did in the 1970s, neoclassical economists could simply ignore it because in their baseline model, workers get what they put in, and so does capital. The rest was just minor details.

Why do we mention this now? Because Fred Moseley from Mount Holyoke College has written an excellent introduction to the neoclassical theory of distribution as well as some ways to critique it for an introductory- or intermediate-level class. Find it here. We highly recommend checking it out and trying it out in your own classes!

advanced pedagogical techniques: introducing the topic of exploitation

"The Intimately Oppressed": How to talk about exploitation in the classroom

 A few years ago, in a conversation one of us had with a fellow graduate student, the issue came to surface of how to approach certain issues that have become a mainstay of the mainstream curriculum over time. We were specifically discussing the issue of how easy it is to fall into the so-called "markets in everything" trap -- whereby you start thinking about how markets for everything from organs to healthcare could solve most of the problems of social inefficiency. But the issue is much more general than that, and exposing that generality is the topic of this post.

So when one of us was discussing how to approach the "markets in everything" issue, which is really quite widespread among the blogosphere (particularly Marginal Revolution, which has made a type of blog series out of the idea... but Greg Mankiw is also guilty of perpetuating the idea, not surprisingly), our friend made the point that, why not start from the other direction, and work your way back? Instead of beginning with the idea that everything should be marketized, begin from the idea and theory that nothing should be marketized, and then ask what would qualify something to be marketized. That is to say, we should expose students' inherent repugnant feelings about a market for body parts or healthcare from the start, and then work backward from there, adding in markets as a qualification of the general argument that commodification should not exist. (In fact, if you think historically, this is actually the way in which the debate occurred -- we didn't start out with a fully marketized society and we only got there from peeling off various layers of social-institutional control!)

It's simple, and it works remarkably well. Furthermore, such a logic can be applied to other ideas which are not easily raised in the classroom, such as the issue of class or exploitation. By starting with certain ideas of exploitation that are more easily recognizable to students (such as the treatment of women in the workplace vs. men), it becomes easier to identify general principles of exploitation that may be applied to workers.

Talking about how women have traditionally been discriminated against in the workplace is a clear example of exploitation. Or talking about how, when they were first integrated into the industrial labor force in the early 1800s, they were pulled from both directions -- into the home because of preconceived notions of women's place in a private sphere; and out to work because of the need to make enough money to feed their children and support their family; all the while not being allowed to vote -- shows vividly how gender norms shape capitalism and employer behavior more generally. The continued persistence and use of racism after formal political freedom had been established by emancipation is another example of using the tools of race or gender to strike at ideas and issues of class exploitation.

Similar arguments can even be made for immigrants. Here is an example of how one of us has incorporated gender into a story of industrial capitalism. We have found that through doing so, it then becomes easier to talk about exploitation in the workplace more generally, because now students have seen how management policy has affected women workers. It is just a small step (really!) from that point to then talking about workers in general.

Sports Stars Versus Business "Stars"

Mankiw links to a Ken Rogoff piece that asks why people seem to have no problem with star athletes pay versus supposed star-CEOs and private business executives.   Mankiw, while not explicitly stating so, appears to agree with Mr. Rogoff. 

The argument is nonsensical for a few big reasons.  First, it assumes that people don’t think superstar athletes are overpaid.  Informal evidence suggests otherwise. Second, athletes are not generally paid millions for leading his or her own team’s failure. Third, athletes, while not always the pinnacle role models we wish them to be, have never contributed to the disintegration of an economy while simultaneously leading the perversion of our democracy -- controlling special interest lobby groups on one hand and begging for government bailouts on the other.

There are differences. Equating 'stars' in the sports industry to the top private sector businesses simply doesn't make sense.

we know what we're protesting

This Crimson article by Harvard undergraduates Rachel Sandalow-Ash and Gabriel H. Bayard from November 2011, addressing the fundamental issues underlying the Occupy Ec 10 movement, did not get nearly the amount of attention that it deserved. Published about a week after the walkout on Mankiw's class, very few sources on the walkout linked to it, instead choosing to focus on the open letter and Crimson editorial(s), which were good, but not very carefully articulated.

We think the exclusion of the Bayard-Sandalow-Ash piece is very unfortunate. The articles which Greg Mankiw chose to cite in this New York Times article "Know What You're Protesting" did not accurately portray the types of issues that most people who chose to walk out have with his course. It would have done more for discourse around the issue if Mankiw had actually spent time dealing with the substantive attacks, instead of largely arguing past the protesters.

For example, Mankiw chose to concentrate his Times article on the argument that economics is mostly a tool, not an ideology. In other words, Mankiw sees the standard introductory economics curriculum as introducing the student to a scientific framework in which students can approach any kind of problem related to public policy or current events. This is a very familiar argument to those of us who have taken an economics course or two -- the idea that we're equipping ourselves with tools to go out and change the world. Too bad those tools are stained with ideology. Let us explain

The issue which Sandalow-Ash and Bayard rightly point out is that the frameworks Mankiw presents are themselves value-laden and politically motivated. So while the efficiency-equity tradeoff seems to offer an analytical framework in which government intervention can be "objectively debated", underlying the framework is a market-centered approach that fails to point out how a more equal society, through promoting stability and long-run health, can help to promote efficiency. And though Mankiw goes to some length to present a consensus among mainstream economists about core issues such as the adverse effects of minimum wages and free trade in his book, both historical experience and a growing literature on these topics have already successfully taken on seemingly-unobjectionable tenets of neoclassical theory.

Overall, we strongly suggest you take a look at the piece by these two very intelligent and socially conscious Harvard students. This is where the Occupy movement's critique is truly located.

anti-mankiw links - or, the defense of manufactures

The other day Professor Mankiw linked to a piece by Christina Romer in the New York Times on why manufacturing should not be subsidized by government policy.

On one hand we can see why this might be a smart policy: manufacturing is past us, isn't it? The U.S. has increasingly moved into smarter, faster sectors of growth like technology, finance, and higher education. The last thing we would need, argue economists such as Romer and Mankiw, is a return to 60s-era economics.

On the other hand, as Jeff Madrick observes in the NewDeal 2.0 blog, manufacturing is only seen as dead because we don't necessarily know what a smarter, leaner, and more efficient manufacturing sector might look like. What is the contradiction between smart technology and good manufacturing jobs? Once upon a time, there wasn't any such clash. But as competition for cheap labor and a variety of factors overwhelmed businesses in the 1970s, "low road" policies were inevitably taken which compromised quality for productivity and low wages. Finance, Madrick notes, took manufacturing's place as the key driver of growth -- and what has that gotten us in the last 40 years? High inequality and relatively stagnant growth and living standards.

Manufacturing -- potentially with a focus on green technologies at the frontier of certain frontiers of economics growth -- can itself become a hotbed of innovation. As Madrick notes, "Isn’t [manufacturing] where the scientists and engineers are? Don’t we learn and innovate by doing? One commentator recently said that those innovations are exploited by others, so it doesn’t matter. Really? Then maybe we should stop promoting R&D altogether." Research and development is key to a vibrant economy. There is no reason to halt our attempts at strengthening them.

A similar point regarding the potential dynamism and value added of the manufacturing sector can be found in the debate which took place in the Economist last summer between Ha-Joon Chang and Jagdish Bhagwati over this same issue. (Chang won the debate). Chang makes an interesting point in his rebuttal to Bhagwati's scepticism about "manufacturing fetishism" which we will end on, here:

Take the case of the Netherlands. Unbeknown to most people, it is world's third largest agricultural exporter, despite having little land (it has the world's fifth highest population density). This has been possible because the Dutch have "industrialised" agriculture by, for example, deploying hydroponic agriculture (growing plants in water) that uses computer-controlled feeding of high-quality chemicals—something that would not have been possible if the Netherlands did not have some of the world's most advanced chemical and electronics industries. In contrast, despite being the world's second most high-tech exporter (measured by the share of high-tech products in manufactured exports), the Philippines has only $2,000 per person income because it makes those products with other people's technologies.

Overall, we at Anti-Mankiw definitely think that the promotion of manufacturing could be an excellent way to revitalize the economy. How the government (or other branches of the state) does so is a different point -- but let's not relegate such an important source of a country's material wealth to the trashbin too quickly!

Branching out: Anti-Mankiw on Twitter and Facebook

If you have a Twitter account, Facebook, or both, be sure to head on over and "follow" or "like" us to receive updates as well as to check out news and blog articles that we're reading!

http://www.facebook.com/pages/Anti-Mankiw/218928821535584

https://twitter.com/#!/AntiMankiw

keeping your head above water: anti-mankiw links

If someone is being "overpaid" here, it surely isn't workers

There are multiple things wrong with Professor Mankiw's recent post about comparing public and private sector employees by compensation.

First of all, the title of the post, "Are federal government workers overpaid?" is misleading. We usually say that someone is overpaid when they are contributing less than they are being compensated. But the CBO report is examining compensation differentials, which is a different issue. The problem is complicated by the fact that public sector workers are engaged in activities (such as education or security) which have clear positive externalities on society, so it's even more difficult to talk about being over or underpaid. (Are the participants in the securitization of bad loans over or underpaid?) It's clear what Mankiw is actually trying to accomplish in his post, and we at Anti-Mankiw can assure you that it has nothing to do with accurately conveying economic research.

Second of all, the report is only for workers in the federal government. In this excellent report by John Schmitt at the Center for Economic Policy Research it was found that state and local government employees are actually paid less than their private sector counterparts, after controlling for observable characteristics (similar to the methodology in the CBO report).

Finally, if a dynamic analysis were performed (i.e., examining the trend of wages in each sector over the last 30 to 40 years), readers would quickly realize that there are more pressing issues at play here. The most important of which may be the fact that wages for both public and private employees have been stagnating since the 1970s. Sure, public employees may have been paid more (according to the study from which the above graph is pulled, however, even that is a contested issue), but the story is more like: private sector wages are falling behind as public sector wages struggle to keep above water. Comparing with the elite 1% over the same 30, 40 year period, you see the drastic explosion of inequality that is the main subject of public debate today. In short, Mankiw is really doing a disservice to the more pressing macroeconomic issues by choosing to focus on whether one sector is more compensated than the other.

Here is another, similar report on this issue ("Public and Private Sector Workers Are in This Together") which focuses on college graduates: http://vox-nova.com/2011/03/17/public-and-private-sector-workers-are-in-this-together/.

Hardly a rosy picture -- for either public or private sector workers. Someone definitely seems to be overpaid here, but it's not workers!

An Obsession with Pigouvian Taxation ?

Mankiw is perhaps the most well-known supporter of Pigouvian taxation on retail gasoline (also known as a carbon tax).  As a review, recall that Pigouvian taxes are taxes enacted to solve for potential negative externalities in a market.  Gasoline consumption leads to more carbon emissions which leads to pollution, which is the negative externality.  This is a simple problem to solve if we just get a handful of smart economists to measure the societal cost/value of the externalities associated with gasoline, slap a tax on the 'bad' stuff to cover that cost, and voila: not only would the government increase it's tax revenue, but more importantly it would incentivize individuals to use less gasoline, thereby polluting less.  

Pigouvian taxes have been proposed for all sorts of things, and some have been enacted in states while others remain largely a theoretical possibility only: tax car crashes, tax irresponsible borrowing, tax fatty foods, tax alcohol and (Mankiw's most recent object of support), a tax on cigarettes. There is evidence that these taxes do indeed create some incentives to 'improve' behavior.  Nevertheless, many mainstream economists are so focused on Pigouvian taxation that it seems they have simply altered their message that "markets are generally good at what they do," to tack on: "... and where they aren't, we can easily make them work properly by either taxation or subsidies."

The focus on Pigouvian taxation, as particularly espoused by New Keynesian economists, may in fact divert attention away from market problems other than simple cases of measurable externalities.  After all, not everything can be solved with taxation policies.  Issues of broken institutions - particularly in the realm of education for example (see our previous post here) cannot be solved by simply slapping a tax on the behavior (in this case, institutions which do not grant the kind of "equality of opportunity" which they are supposed to in a democratic society).  Issues of institutional fairness, corporate cronyism, socio-economic mobility and opportunity, and other more structural issues, are not likely to be easily solved by imposing a tax to try to punish the behavior.  Finally, issues of unbalanced and asymmetric information in many markets (including credit markets) are not going to be easily solved with simple taxation.  

In cases where Pigouvian taxation may be appropriate, there are further concerns with implementation.  For example, there may be additional bureaucracy that comes with the new source of tax revenue.  As technologies change and societal costs change, so too would the taxation policies need to be updated.  Would we trust congress to be dynamic enough to change these rates accordingly.  And if not, what sorts of negative effects on private activity might that cause?  And even if our government were to support pigouvian taxation long-term, does this mean we could or should do away with certain regulations to maintain 'optimal' performance?

Additionally, it is not an easy thing to measure the societal costs of specific behavior that may contribute to pollution, or poor health, and so on. Assumptions are often made in coming up with a calculation of 'optimal' Pigouvian taxation - assumptions that may be wrong, or right only in present circumstances.  You simply can't take a message like this to a politician and expect them to enact legislation based on it:

Despite all the uncertainties in the quantification of externalities [from waste disposal], this study has pointed out that preliminary estimates of external costs and benefits can be established. Such estimates cannot be presented as exact values, but they can be used as decision support and as an instrument to explain the trade-offs that are implicitly made in political decisions. 

Coase (of Coase's theorem) pointed out that many externalities are reciprocal in nature:  i.e. a polluter causes harm to those in a given area through it's actions, but those in a given area cause harm by forcing (or making it costly for) the polluter to change their actions as opposed to, for example, leaving the area.  Some economists might argue that he was simplifying the issue, but even so the solution of what is 'optimal' then becomes even more complicated:

Nevertheless, there are grey areas and situations change.  Thus, it may be desirable to have a system of bilateral taxation

Finally, at the end of the day, there is a political component to deciding the merits of pigouvian taxation.  Economists often discount politics as something outside their purview (despite their own internal biases) but all the studies in the world cannot convince politicians who may have an ideological disagreement with the government picking and choosing what behaviors are 'good' and what behaviors are 'bad'.  

So, when taking consideration of measurement problems associated with externalities (and changes in a measured externality over time), political barriers, and ideological barriers to pigouvian policies, it becomes less clear how useful such policies can be the real world.  Pigouvian taxation, at the end of the day, certainly has its place.  But one hopes that that place is not a grand pedestal that outshines all other solutions to the problems of the day.  

an A for ideology, an F for technique

In this article Greg Mankiw describes the argument behind a New York Times opinion piece written by Yoram Bauman, of "10 Principles of Economics, Translated" fame. The thrust of Bauman's thesis is that economics majors, by drilling ideas about incentives, private property, and self-interest into their heads for their classes, are thereby trained to be more selfish. It is supported, supposedly, by evidence showing how the economics majors were less likely to contribute to two charities presented to them when registering for classes.

Greg Mankiw doubts this implication of Bauman's findings. Mankiw basically takes issue with the following quote from Bauman's article:

You may question whether these groups actually serve the common good, but that’s mostly beside the point. Regardless of the groups’ actual social value, a purely self-interested individual would choose to free-ride rather than contribute; after all, a single $3 donation is not going to make a noticeable difference in tuition rates.

Mankiw, in criticizing this passage, makes a fair point: the supposedly positive externalities of any public good do need to be carefully examined and analyzed, even for small values of contribution, and someone with a social science background, particularly economics, may be well-equipped to do so. They might be less willing to dole out cash to a random charity, but their education is put to use in other ways that are beneficial to society.

While Mankiw may have a point, we at Anti-Mankiw strongly disagree that Bauman's essential claim that economics is ideological evaporates in the face of Mankiw's criticism. In fact, published studies have been done on surveys of students who have successfully completed an introductory course to economics in which the mainstream view is presented without any critical perspective, and these studies offer an interesting take on how ideology matters in the classroom.

The findings? The majority of students 6-12 months after taking such a course recall most quickly the normative aspects of the course but are relatively less able to solve simple problems related to these ideas (to see how they might work or not work in practice). Ideas like "taxes are bad for efficiency, though not for equity", and "prices not set by the free market lead to welfare losses and are therefore undesirable" are common, but give them a question to solve on calculating consumer surplus, for example, and they cannot deliver. These are consistent with our own experiences in teaching introductory courses offering a mainstream view, and indeed, on a certain level makes sense: most cases, you may just get the main point of an argument and not necessarily the details behind the argument. But nevertheless, it's presented as an argument, and therefore not of course the only perspective!

[See Bartlett, Ferber, and Green's "Political Orientation and the Decision to Major in Economics" in International Review of Economic Education; and Faravelli's "How Context Matters" in Journal of Public Economics for two resources. These ideas were also reflected on based on a correspondent's current dissertation research which we are not allowed to cite openly.]

The lesson learned?  That market-centric views and market-centric efficiency criteria are at the center of any policy evaluation of a student, leaving no room to discuss how efficiency is not a scientific concept. (See this article by Rick Wolff, entitled, "Whose Efficiency?" which does a great job of breaking down the different models. Duncan Kennedy and Frank Michelman also have a nice piece as well entitled "Are Property and Contract Efficient?".) Second, it is highly questionable whether an intro course "enlightens" the student in the way Mankiw believes it does. Admittedly, part of the problem here is with education itself -- how we train our students and so on -- but Mankiw, writer of the currently most successful textbook, is therefore part of the problem, not the solution.

It's a short step from this final point to the idea that a better economics textbook -- which either clears away the ideological content and works more like the seminar room or offers a critical approach that draws on many different worldviews (or both) -- is just on the horizon...

anti-mankiw links; or, education and income inequality -- in which direction does the causal relationship go?

In this article from a few days ago, Mankiw links to a post which suggests that increased education, particularly graduate school training, is a way of lessening income inequality in the U.S.

How does Greg see the relationship between education and income distribution? For him, increased opportunity, fostered through more education, leads to gains in an individual's productive potential. This does not necessarily imply, for him, that education will automatically lead to gains in income -- just that the potential for gains will be increased. This view is reflected in this article from his blog.

But what if the causal mechanism actually goes the other way -- i.e., from economic backgrounds and economic inequality to human capital growth? That is the story behind this Crooked Timber article and the associated New York Times article it quotes. A collection of other works questioning the role of education as an engine for social mobility can be found here, at the Legal History Blog.

When "class matters" to human capital accumulation, we are, all of a sudden, in very different territory -- not just because financial resources become important -- but because of the disproportionate impact the rich have on democratic institutions (an argument which, we believe if push came to shove, Mankiw would not disagree with).

But, thankfully, it is not unfamiliar territory. As education theorists have known for decades, economic elites have a disproportionate impact on the educational system in terms of funding and also in terms of influence. A classic in this line of literature is Bowles and Gintis' Schooling in Capitalist America, which argued that classrooms operate as training grounds for an obedient and productive workforce. The Bowles-Gintis theory of human capital seems to be supported by more recent discussions on the importance, or lack thereof, of creativity in the classroom (via MarginalRevolution). Though Tabarrok is a libertarian, we are certain he would agree with a corollary of the argument advanced in his article that educational policy (influenced by elites with political power) promotes a docile student body.

In summary, there seems to be two main ways in which one can view education and the "human capital" question. One may view education as a source of increased opportunity for a productive workforce. On the other hand, one may think that the problem lies in economic inequality and its egregious influence on educational institutions -- which means that more education will not address the problems of inequality in society and that it may in fact promote such problems. Let us not forget that there is, historically or cross-sectionally, no unidirectional relationship between the average education of a society and economic inequality!

We at Anti-Mankiw believe that more attention should be placed on this latter issue, given that there is more convincing evidence of that thesis.

rodrik on occupy ec 10

Responding to the issues surrounding the Ec 10 walkout, highly acclaimed development economist Dani Rodrik weighs in on the particular question of the ideological content of mainstream economics here.

We at Anti-Mankiw are glad to see the debate moving past the difficult-to-support claim that mainstream economics is not political, or that Mankiw's ideology is "not at all obvious". As we tried to emphasize in a previous article, a key sign of an ideological approach, especially in economics, is when space is not opened up to a critical analysis of the economy.

We are hoping that Mankiw can begin to address the most important question behind the walkout, namely, why any group of students would choose to walk out on a course that has (in theory) so much potential for enriching discourse on the economy. Thankfully, Rodrik suggests to us an entrypoint. His premise is the vast set of  policy proposals often invoked in economic theory. As he states succinctly here:

Indeed, though you may be excused for skepticism if you have not immersed yourself in years of advanced study in economics, coursework in a typical economics doctoral program produces a bewildering variety of policy prescriptions depending on the specific context. Some of the frameworks economists use to analyze the world favor free markets, while others don’t. In fact, much economic research is devoted to understanding how government intervention can improve economic performance. And non-economic motives and socially cooperative behavior are increasingly part of what economists study.

It is not clear to us how Mankiw's particular assumption set -- i.e., his 10 principles -- makes him immune to Rodrik's point. Aren't they just another assumption set, chosen by a professor with certain political aims? The weakness in Mankiw's approach is in the level of critical analysis that takes place in discussing economics. And why should introductory students at Harvard be spared of learning about the tools necessary for critique? Rodrik continues:

Now let the reporter go undercover as a student in the professor’s advanced graduate seminar on international trade theory. Let him pose the same question: Is free trade good? I doubt that the answer will come as quickly and be as succinct this time around. In fact, the professor is likely to be stymied by the question. “What do you mean by ‘good?’” he will ask. “And good for whom?” 

In other words, economic policy proposals are much more nuanced than Mankiw seems to present. (A similar argument could easily be made for recent economics work on minimum wages.) And if we were to add such nuance, this does not necessarily make things to difficult to grasp. At UMass, we ask these kinds of questions to our undergraduates: we ask them how different efficiency criteria might change ones policy proposal, and we question the foundations of a hedonistic approach to economic theory. While such discussions admittedly require sources outside of the standard textbook, there is no need to go "too far" for a solid discussion of these issues. They are definitely in the reach of first year students.

We'll let Rodrik have the last word here:

Applied appropriately and with a healthy dose of common sense, economics would have prepared us for the financial crisis and pointed us in the right direction to fix what caused it. But the economics we need is of the “seminar room” variety, not the “rule-of-thumb” kind. It is an economics that recognizes its limitations and knows that the right message depends on the context.

That's right. Contrary to what Mankiw might say, there is much that students can learn about the financial crisis which would come from a different approach to introductory economics. Let's not speak so condescendingly of them!

anti-mankiw links; or, the dangers of technocracy

On his blog and in his New York Times articles, N. Gregory Mankiw has slowly but carefully advanced a position which is critical of fiscal expansion. He has given a variety of reasons for his position. These include: fiscal responsibility provides more certainty for investors in determining the future potential of economic growth; as well as observing that the short-sighted character of most politicians leads them to underestimate how difficult an unbalanced budget can be to get out of in the long run.

In presenting these views to the public (i.e. in terms of his rhetoric), Mankiw has often said that he's demonstrating a centrist view of the issue -- evidenced, for example, by his signature on the Simpson-Bowles plan which garnered the support of people on the left and right. Deficit reduction is just simple economics, according to him, because we need investors to stay confident in the strength of our economy.

But deficit reduction is not that simple and focusing on it during a recession might not be the best option. Indeed, the argument that deficit reduction sustains confidence does not hold up. The correct argument for deficit reduction actually seems to be something a bit different: namely, that it can potentially reign in overzealous spending at a time when the economy can afford to do so. That is the gist behind this report by Arjun Jayadev and Mike Konczal entitled "The Boom, not the Slump". In that article (which was referenced in a blog post by Paul Krugman) they work through a few case studies which analyze the timing of austerity measures vis-a-vis movement in some of the economy's broad indicators to show that the case for austerity is weak. And on the other hand, as the Great Depression and World War II showed us, the standard argument for deficit spending in the case of recession has much stronger empirical support.

Still, even when Mankiw's "confidence fairy" argument falls, can he rely on a sound logical footing for his argument? The Jayadev and Konczal paper suggests at first glance that he can't. That is to say, the "sound" economics of Mankiw is really just ideology dressed up as science. In this interesting Monthly Review piece, Marcello Musto applies that exact idea to Europe. Simply put, technocratic discourse is sometimes laden with violence against anyone willing to speak out against the "science" of economic thinking. The result, at least in Europe, is one of the most acute forms of class warfare.

As Musto himself puts it:

The separation between economics and politics that differentiates capitalism from previous modes of production has reached its highest point.  Economics not only dominates politics, setting its agenda and shaping its decisions, but lies outside its jurisdiction and democratic control -- to the point where a change of government no longer changes the direction of economic and social policy.

Introductory economics should start off with a very simple idea: be immediately distrustful of anyone you see (especially elites) presenting the "consensus" view within the economics profession as the "right" policy platform. And, indeed, this is the type of "apolitical" discourse that can end up being the most lethal kind for workers or other groups with less power in the economy.

Mankiw on the Consensus View Within Economics

Mankiw often likes to tout the view that there is vast agreement in the economics profession over most of the major economic issues. In chapter 2 of his textbook, for example, he argues that while most economists differ on normative claims in economics (i.e., what ought to happen), there is widespread agreement about its positive claims (i.e., what actually happens). He often cites various polls of economists in support of his argument. His most recent cite is here.  Another one here. Another one here....  It's almost as if he's not only trying to convince the public that economists largely agree on everything; he's trying to convince himself.  

There are, however, a few problems with how his argument is made.  

1. It's easy, though misleading, to cite sentence-long themes framed in a specific way and obtain consensus - it's much harder to dig into the details and find the same level of agreement.   For example, the statement "If the federal budget is to be balanced, it should be done over the business cycle rather than yearly" might get 85% support among polled economists, but one wonders whether, if the question were asked "how" or via "what mechanism" etc., the agreement would be drastically reduced.  This piece by Arindrajit Dube leads us to reflect on the idea that if the survey questions were framed differently or according to greater detail, they might reflect a growing consensus within economics that minimum wages do not necessarily have a significantly negative impact on employment. Other examples abound.

2. It's easy to get consensus if you only ask people who agree with you. I'm not suggesting that no members of the AEA or other academic economists polled have any heterodox inclinations (for example John Kenneth Galbraith was actually president of the AEA in 1972), but when the vast majority of economics departments and its institutions are run by and for mainstream economics, and when heterodox economists are so marginalized from the profession that they may not even be a part of mainstream professional institutions, you are bound to get the mainstream response.   All you've really proven is that on some things there exists agreement among mainstream academic economists only.    Additionally, if you only ask American economists, the skew is even greater because the United States has some of the least academic support for heterodox thought.   A good example of this fact is the story of how a whole heterodox department is forced to close its doors. Expand this to business economists and financial economics experts who may not call themselves 'academic economists' but who, nevertheless, are prominently featured in policy circles and mainstream media outlets, and the skew could get even wider.

3. Perhaps the most important point is that agreement does not make you right. When groupthink is set as a priority above seeking the truth, that in and of itself suggests there is a fundamental problem within the economic profession. And that, at the end of the day, is the direction Mankiw would have mainstream economics continue to travel - a conglomeration of brainwashed groupthinkers who close their eyes to any alternative dialog that might challenge their worldview.

For whom exactly is inequality good?

According to a clip from Richard Epstein, inequality benefits everyone. His appearance on PBS, linked by Mankiw’s blog, gives the standard free-market trickle-down argument about income inequality. According to Epstein, when 1% of the people own ⅓ of the wealth, it gives the rest of us poor 99%'ers incentive to work hard, innovate, and strive for success, in the end creating an even bigger overall “pie” to distribute. Unequal distribution makes everyone is better off, so we should stop complaining about the haves and have-nots. But what is missing in Epstein’s rosy free-market idealist picture about the merits of inequality?

Decline of Real Wages

Epstein’s argument that all incomes have risen under neoliberal capitalism is wrong. Real wage data suggests that in fact real wages have stagnated over the last several decades, despite substantial increases in productivity and wealth. While the pie may indeed be bigger, certainly not everyone is better off. Further, the segment of the population most stricken by inequality and poverty are children and the elderly, who may be even worse off than originally estimated. 

Importance of Relative Income

Behavioral economists have been good at showing that what matters is not the absolute level of income, but rather how we earn relative to others. If more folks are falling at the bottom end of the income distribution, with lower and lower relative standing, then how are we all better off? In fact, some very influential behavioral economists from Mankiw's own institution and down the road at MIT, Michael Norton and Dan Ariely, have shown that most citizens would prefer a more equal society.

Political Power

It’s no news that income inequality undermines democracy. With resources concentrated at the top, some portions of the population can buy their way into political power and create major barriers to entry into elite circles. Epstein however idealizes perfect mobility in an unequal society. Even the Freakonomics blog was able to explain this point a while back, quoting Daron Acemoglu:

"First, people’s well-being may directly depend on inequality, for example, because they view a highly unequal society as unfair or because the utility loss due to low status of the have-nots may be greater than the utility gain due to the higher status of the haves. Second and more importantly, equality of opportunity may be harder to achieve in an unequal society … Third and most importantly, inequality impacts politics. Economic power tends to beget political power even in democratic and pluralistic societies. "

give thanks to capitalism

An "In the News" excerpt in chapter 7 of Mankiw's Principles of Economics (4e) is titled "The Miracle of the Market" and begins with the following proposition:

An opinion columnist suggests that the next time you sit down for Thanksgiving dinner, you should give thanks not only for the turkey on your plate but also for the economic system in which you live.

The topic is Thanksgiving dinner and the argument is that we owe our Thanksgiving turkey to the division of labor, supply chains, and the pursuit of private gains. Of course, the article -- an opinion piece from the Boston Globe (does that count as "In the News" to you?) -- is meant to support the "argument" laid out over the previous 13 pages that "the price of turkey at the supermarket is fair", from a social efficiency standpoint, as long as free markets are the means by which scarce resources are allocated. Central planning would require vast amounts of information and time to do what a free market economy does completely on its own.

Fair point about central planning -- but why bring it up in the first place? Why does the author's argument about the coordinating miracle of the free market have to be compared to the extreme opposite of a completely centrally planned economy?

While we can never be certain of the author's intentions, let us offer a response: perhaps elements of a planned economy trickle into the author's story in ways overlooked or simply ignored by him. In other words, it appears to us as though the tactical use of attacking the "central planning" argument is to divert attention from more important and empirically relevant matters, such as the following:

Who determines the price of gasoline used by the trucks delivering the turkeys to the store? Oil cartels play an important role in determining prices at the pump. 

Who coordinated work at the factories which produce the feed and raise the turkeys? Most likely, these tasks were performed by a manager and other centralized authority figures. 

Who regulated the quality of the Turkeys or facilitated their transportation? Government laws and statutes were necessary for these things. 

Upon reflection, it seems that there does exist an essential economic planning element to your Thanksgiving dinner. Imperfectly competitive markets and the organization of economic activity which takes place in the firm are important examples of cases in which economic agents act collectively to plan and alter economic outcomes.

So this year, give thanks to capitalist social relations for the meal on your plate. While Mankiw has tried time and again to assert the universality of the "free market" model and its relationship to Thanksgiving, a simple look around at how economies actually function suggests otherwise.